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I. Introduction 
 
Block (2015) presented a defense of free will and a criticism of those who use 
scientific arguments from biology and neurophysiology to deny it. Most of that paper 
is a “deconstruction” of the reasoning that determinists use to deny individual freedom 
of choice. In their response to Block (2015), EWS (2016) construct a positive theory 
that Block allegedly professes, and then refute it. Yet, they mischaracterize Block’s 
view and a number of their criticisms are misguided.  In what follows, we will clarify 
the nature and the implications of Block’s position in Block (2015) in order to dispel 
the misunderstanding, and we will respond to some of EWS’s specific criticisms. 
 
In section II we respond to the specific arguments offered by EWS Section III 
is given over to other considerations which incline us in the direction of free will and 
away from determinism, both on the basis of these doctrines themselves, and on their 
compatibility with Austrian economics and the libertarian political philosophy. We 
conclude in section IV. 
 
II. Block’s Non-Spooky Ontology 
 
We wish to start by noting how EWS have mischaracterized Block’s3 
understanding of freedom, particularly as it relates to physical causation. Consider this 
claim from EWS: 
 
“Contrary  to  Block’s  assertion,  individuals  can  and  do  make  choices  in  a  
deterministic  world.  If  given  a  choice,  for  example,  they  could  choose  whether  
to  drink  scotch  or  soda.  These  are  not  ‘free’ choices,  meaning  free  will  is  not  
the  proximate  cause  of  the  choice.  They  are  choices  in  that  there  is  no  external  
constraint  on  their  drink  selection… According  to  free  will  advocates,  our  will  
                                                          
2 The authors thank David Gordon for helpful suggestions. The usual caveats of course apply; we are 
the only one responsible for all errors of omission and commission.  
3 All references to “Block” such as this, unless otherwise specified, refer to the one article, Block 
(2015). 
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floats  in  space  somewhere  outside  the  brain.  It emanates from our brain” (EWS, 
2016).   
 
EWS are here presenting free will as something outside of the physical causal 
order, floating in space somewhere. Block, however, does not hold that freedom is 
separate in this way. This can be clarified by considering the fact that, though Block 
does deny determinism, he also is a compatibilist. That is, Block believes that even if 
determinism were true, we may still have a relevantly free will; determinism and 
freedom are compatible. Freedom, then, does not require anything “floating” outside of 
the physical causal order that determinists believe in.  
 
According to Block, although “there  are  causal  connections  in  life,  in  
chemistry,  in  physics,  and  some  of  what  occurs  to  us  is  completely  causal  and  
apart  from  our  will… there  are  at  least  some  actions  over  which  we  have  
complete  control.” This does not imply any anti-physicalist theory of action or mental 
states, or any “ghost in the machine” ontology; on the contrary – Block rejects such 
ontology outright. It simply means that there are free and unfree decisions and that the 
difference is fundamental. But this is not expressed in terms of the mind-body duality 
or any other variation on the old Cartesian theme. The position is perfectly compatible 
with physicalism and materialism.  
 
An example of a free will doctrine rejecting the Cartesian dualism is the one 
offered by German biologist Martin Heisenberg (not to be confused with his physicist 
father, Werner). He argues (Heisenberg, 2005) that freedom of action for an individual 
is not predicated upon the existence of the consciousness exempted from 
neurophysiological causality. On the contrary, “we can act differently” because our 
biological make up is such as to allow for the formation of the “self-initiating, adaptive 
behaviour”. This means that, purely biologically speaking, human individuals, as well 
as virtually all animals, behave both as objects of external causation and as autonomous 
initiators of behaviour. For example, Heisenberg demonstrated in the laboratory setting 
that flies display changes in behaviour that are completely self-initiated, i.e. not caused 
by any previous experience or evolutionary pattern. They developed completely new 
mechanisms of dealing with external stimuli in real time (or multiple different responses 
none of which was developed before), in the same way humans can modify their 
behaviour in real time.  Even at the level of unicellar organisms a pattern is observed 
of changing behaviour “ex nihilo”, without any external causation.4 Human freedom of 
choice is just one highly sophisticated form of this general biological capability of life 
to initiate behavioural changes independently of any external stimuli. So, free will and 
freedom of choice do not require a “ghost in the machine” ontology, and are perfectly 
compatible with modern biological science. 
 
More generally, many philosophic doctrines understand freedom of will in 
terms of discerning whether an agent’s action has the right sort of source, such as 
coming from the agent’s own desires without being coerced, or from the agent’s own 
capacity to act according to reason. As long as an agent’s choice comes from the 
relevant process or has the relevant source within the agent, then we can say that the 
agent chooses it freely. When a behaviour results independent of that source, then we 
would say that it was unfree in some way, perhaps being a nervous tick or seizure rather 
                                                          
4 See Heisenberg (2005:165) 
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than a choice at all, or perhaps being a coerced choice, or some other variety of 
unfreedom. There are a significant variety of contenders for the relevant agential source 
compatible with ordinary physicalism, requiring nothing floating outside of the agent’s 
brain or otherwise spooky, and many would be adequate for Block’s purpose. 
 
We will note here that Block (2015) is committed to compatibilism, so holds 
that we can be free even if determinism is true, though he thinks that determinism is in 
fact false. The importance of this compatibilism is two-fold. First, it makes clear that 
the sort of freedom Block believes in does not require anything supernatural or beyond 
what would exist in a deterministic physical universe. Second, it highlights that there 
are yet further arguments to be given beyond those from Block (2015) for why 
determinist theories do not undermine freedom; such theories are false, but even if they 
were true we could still be free. 
 
III. The Relevance of Non-deterministic Physics 
 
The next issue we wish to take up regards Block’s (2015) appeal to cosmology 
and quantum mechanics. EWS seem to reject the significance of cosmological 
considerations altogether when they object that “a  determinist  can  certainly  hold  a  
perspective  on  how  the  brain  is  structured  and  why  choices  result  without  in  
either  case  delving  into  the  beginnings  of  the  universe.”  
 
Block uses these scientific theories to demonstrate that the notion of 
deterministic causality is not a necessary feature of all theoretical explanations of 
natural phenomena within the current leading scientific theories. This is relevant 
because some people believe that human behaviour must be deterministic because they 
hold that the physical world as a whole is deterministic. Block’s point, however, is that 
our best scientific understanding shows that at least some things in the world are not 
deterministic. This shifts the burden of proof to those who believe that human behaviour 
is deterministic. Such determinists must justify thinking that humans are like 
clockwork, rather than resembling atoms moving in a cloud chamber or the universe 
emerging in the Big Bang.  
 
IV. The Uncertainty Principle 
 
A further point of contention between EWS and Block regards the of quantum 
mechanics. Block (2015) maintains that within contemporary quantum mechanics, the 
uncertainty principle holds that the behaviour of certain subatomic particles is non-
deterministic. EWS object, claiming that the principle is  not  about  cause  and  effect, 
it concerns simultaneous  measurement.  Spthe uncertainty  principle  avers that  precise,  
simultaneous  measurement  of  some  complementary  variables  -­-­  such  as  the  
position  and  momentum  of  a  subatomic  particle  -­-­  is  impossible” (EWS). To 
evidence this claim, EWS write that many scientists, including Albert Einstein, hold 
that “the  Heisenberg  uncertainty  principle  simply  illustrates  that  human  knowledge  
about  the  absolute  nature  of  the  universe  is  limited.” That is, the principle is not 
about the actual nature of the physical objects, but merely about the limits of our ability 
to measure those objects. We wish to point out here that the interpretation from EWS 
conflicts with the dominant interpretation among physicists.5 On the dominant 
                                                          
5 See, Heisenberg, [1930] 1949; Bohr, 1949. 
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interpretation, the uncertainty principle does not merely claim that the measurement of 
complementary variables is impossible (although it includes that). It also directly and 
unequivocally denies the standard for a particle with fully specified initial conditions it 
is not possible to predict through which of two slits it will pass in the famous double-
slit experiment.6 It is possible only to calculate the probability of arrival of a photon at 
the detector behind the double slit plate. The “uncertainty” in the “uncertainty 
principle” refers to this probabilistic behaviour. In classical physics, once you know the 
initial conditions of an object, such as position and momentum, you can predict its 
trajectory; in quantum physics you can predict only the probability of a trajectory. The 
ordinary Newtonian causation does not apply at this level.  
 
Moreover, quantum mechanics is much more than a theoretical scandal for 
determinism. It really proves strictly that determinism is false. In the absence of 
deterministic causality of the Newtonian-Einsteinian kind, the actions of humans, as 
well as events in nature, are characterized by a tremendous amount of indeterminacy. 
Our writing of this rejoinder was not predetermined at the moment the Newtonian clock 
was put in motion at the beginning of the Universe; it is rather a product of trillions of 
tiny, uncontrollable quantum fluctuations. No one can predict our future behaviour 
based on our past history, for the future is in fact not fully determined by the past. 
Contrary to determinism, things could have been different.   
 
Regarding EWS’s appeal to the authority of Einstein, it seems that the latter was 
simply mistaken and could not bring himself to accept the unavoidable consequence of 
quantum mechanics – that the old Newtonian deterministic worldview cannot survive 
in modern physics. He famously said in a bitter exchange with one of the master-
theoreticians of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr: “God does not play dice”, alluding to 
the alleged impossibility of probabilistic laws of nature. Bohr responded to Einstein this 
way: “don’t tell God what to do” (Snow, 1981, p. 84). Indeed, as it would became 
obvious later, Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Dirac and others were right and Einstein was 
wrong. Quantum mechanical laws are probably the most rigorously tested laws in the 
history of science and nobody has ever been able to demonstrate a single problem with 
them. Einstein, who by 1930 became an outsider in modern physics, was joined by other 
lesser figures in concocting all kinds of metaphysical speculations of why and how 
quantum mechanics may not be the “full story”.  The often cited paper by Einstein and 
two coauthors from the 1930s (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935) claimed that the 
phenomenon of quantum entanglement, a feature that a pair of entangled particles 
seems to “communicate” instantaneously, prompted Einstein to claim that this would 
contradict the relativity theory (the information would travel faster than light) and 
represented it as a “spooky action at a distance.”7 During 1960s and 1970s, a theoretical 
model and an experimental design were developed that allowed physicists to test 
rigorously the entanglement prediction. The results, repeated many thousand times 
since the 1970s, confirmed that entanglement was real: Bohr was right and Einstein was 
wrong.  
 
All Einstein’s efforts to discredit relativistic, non-deterministic consequences of 
quantum mechanics were just a nostalgic attempt to resurrect the old Newtonian 
                                                          
6  For further elaboration see Feynman, Leighton and Sands (1965, pp. 1.1 – 1.8). 
 
7 https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=spooky+action+at+a+distance+einstein; accessed on 
5/21/16 
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worldview, without any scientific justification whatsoever. It was driven by 
philosophical aversion towards scientific indeterminism, rather than by any solid 
argument. As Martin Heisenberg said of Einstein and his fellow quantum mechanics 
sceptics: “It would be in their view desirable to return to the reality concept of classical 
physics… They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose 
smallest parts behave objectively in the same sense the trees and rocks do, irrespective 
of whether or not we observe them…  It cannot be our task to formulate the wishes as 
to how the atomic phenomena should be; our task could only be to understand them” 
(Heisenberg, 2000: 129). 
 
We see, then, that Einstein’s comments and reservations about quantum mechanics 
were not an alternative scientific theory calling it into question, but irrelevant and 
baseless private opinions properly ignored by modern science.  And therefore Block’s 
(2015) invocation of quantum mechanics as an example of breaking down of the 
Newtonian cause and effect determinism is fully justified. 
 
V. Freedom and Punishment 
 
We will now move on from the matters of physics to consider EWS’s objection 
to Block’s (2015) considerations of punishment. Block argued that punishment of 
violent criminals who will not repeat their offenses depends upon a belief in free will. 
EWS respond that this overlooks restitution  and  deterrence. Deterrence in particular 
has long been accepted by theorists sceptical of free will as sufficient justification for 
punishment. 
 
One thing that is important to note, however, is that punishment is expected to 
deter crime because it changes the incentives, particularly increasing the costs of crime, 
for potential criminals. Such deterrence presupposes a conscious subject who rationally 
responds to incentives, and thus can be deterred. Such rational choice in response to 
incentives, however, constitutes precisely the sort of free will that Block endorses. The 
deterrence-based arguments for punishment, then, presuppose freedom rather than 
providing a justification for punishment independent of freedom.  
 
Matters are no better with regard to EWS’s treatment of restitution. Drawing on 
Rothbard’s understanding of criminal sanctions as properly aimed as restitution rather 
than retribution, EWS argue that restitution “… is  not  about  the  reason  a  criminal  
does  something” including whether the criminal act was determined or free. EWS thus 
hold, contrary to Block (2015) that punishment in a libertarian society, because it is 
based on restitution, does not depend upon free will. 
 
The first problem with EWS’s suggestion is that restitution does not seem to 
justify sanctions in an important set of crimes, particularly murder. To whom is the 
murderer is going to make restitution?8 Rothbard, of course, did not overlook the need 
to deal with murder and he explicitly sees restitution as the basis for only some of the 
sanctions necessary in a libertarian society. Restitution is a principal concern for crimes 
short of murder, and Rothbard emphasizes it as a part of his critique of then fashionable 
concepts of  criminal punishment as “paying debt to society.”. He wants to rehabilitate 
older individualistic notions of restitution to the victims. However, for the case of 
                                                          
8 Apart of course, from the heirs of the victim. 
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murder, Rothbard, according to the proportionality criterion, advocated the death 
penalty: “under libertarian law, capital punishment would have to be confined strictly 
to the crime of murder. For a criminal would only lose his right to life if he had first 
deprived some victim of that same right” (Rothbard, 1998: 85). So we see that 
Rothbard’s own account of punishment, though primarily grounded in restitution, 
includes elements of retribution. 
 
There is a more pressing problem for EWS’s appeal to restitution, for restitution 
too presupposes that people have free will. In particular, an agent’s free will is what 
determines who exactly owes restitution. To see this, suppose that there is no free will, 
and the present authors steal a car. EWS and other free will deniers do not seem to have 
an adequate way of determining who should pay restitution. Perhaps we, the thieves, 
should pay, but it could just as well be our friends, families, “society,” or non-human 
parts of nature that played a role in causing the theft of the car. If we are all unfree, it is 
not clear why some person in the causal chain rather than another should be made to 
pay. To be clear, it will do no good to say that the people actually physically taking the 
car are the ones who must pay restitution, for we may simply add that we use a drone 
or robot to steal the car. Assuming one does not wish to say that the drone must pay 
restitution, one must explain why the demand goes back to us (the senders of the drone) 
but not back further to those that caused us to send the drone. We are poor little 
marionettes subservient to the biological causation in our brains and of outside forces. 
It’s not clear how one can establish the legal concept of individual responsibility for 
restitution (EWS seem to advocate that) without accepting the notion that a criminal 
has free will, and is thereby responsible  for committing a crime.  
 
VI. Austrian Economics and Free Will 
 
As a final reply to specific criticisms from EWS, we will take up the relation of 
Austrian economics and free will. EWS describe Mises, Hayek and Spencer as Austrian 
economists and “determinists,” We are not sure why they include Spencer, who is not 
in any clear sense an Austrian economist, but assume EWS are thinking of Spencer as 
something of a “fellow traveler” with the Austrians. We will focus our concern on 
Mises, the exemplar of Austrian economists. EWS appear inconsistent in their treatment 
of Mises, first describing him as a “determinist,” later as merely “not ruling out 
determinism,” and then finally evidencing their interpretation of Mises with a quotation 
from Human Action (Mises, 1998) in which Mises argues that for the purposes of the 
science of economics one does not have to bother at all with issues of determinism and 
free will. He simply points out that the problem of free will belongs to psychology or 
ethics and not the economics which is the subject matter of Human Action. Therefore, 
citing the passage from Human Action which expresses this view is irrelevant for the 
debate about free will, and does not prove that Mises held any particular view in this 
regard, even less that he was a “determinist” or rejected free will.9  
 
In other areas, however, Mises takes a stance supporting a sort a view of 
freedom more or less like that defended by Block. For instance, Mises (1962) writes: 
“Man is not, like the animals, an obsequious puppet of instincts and sensual impulses. 
Man has the power to suppress instinctive desires, he has a will of his own, he chooses 
                                                          
9 Gordon (2016) mentions “Mises’s account of free will as a methodological postulate, as well as 
Mises’s criticism of economic determinism in Theory and History.” 
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between incompatible ends. In this sense he is a moral person; in this sense he is free.”10 
This brings out an important way in which all Austrian economists must endorse free 
will, for perhaps the most basic building block of this school of thought is that “man 
acts.” Let us elaborate on this notion by considering an extended quote from the outset 
of Mises’s (1998, p.11) magnificent and monumental volume:  
 
“Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into 
operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's 
meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's 
conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such 
paraphrases may clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. 
But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement or commentary. 
 
“Conscious or purposeful behavior is in sharp contrast to unconscious behavior, 
i.e., the reflexes and the involuntary responses of the body's cells and nerves to stimuli. 
People are sometimes prepared to believe that the boundaries between conscious 
behavior and the involuntary reaction of the forces operating within man's body are 
more or less indefinite. This is correct only as far as it is sometimes not easy to establish 
whether concrete behavior is to be considered voluntary or involuntary. But the 
distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness is nonetheless sharp and can 
be clearly determined. 
 
“The unconscious behavior of the bodily organs and cells is for the acting ego 
no less a datum than any other fact of the external world. Acting man must take into 
account all that goes on within his own body as well as other data, e.g., the weather or 
the attitudes of his neighbors. There is, of course, a margin within which purposeful 
behavior has the power to neutralize the working of bodily factors. It is feasible within 
certain limits to get the body under control. Man can sometimes succeed through the 
power of his will in overcoming sickness, in compensating for the innate or acquired 
insufficiency of his physical constitution, or in suppressing reflexes. As far as this is 
possible, the field of purposeful action is extended. If a man abstains from controlling 
the involuntary reaction of cells and nerve centers, although he would be in a position 
to do so, his behavior is from our point of view purposeful.” This contribution of Mises’ 
implies that people have a will of their own through which they make purposeful 
choices. This will is distinct from mere behavior or “reflexes.” 
 
We see a similar emphasis on distinguishing action from mere behaviour in the 
work of Austrian economist Murray Rothbard. For instance, Rothbard (1981) writes in 
this regard:  
 
“Suppose, for a moment, that we define a virtuous act as bowing in the direction 
of Mecca every day at sunset. We attempt to persuade everyone to perform this act. But 
suppose that instead of relying on voluntary conviction we employ a vast number of 
police to break into everyone's home and see to it that every day they are pushed down 
to the floor in the direction of Mecca. No doubt by taking such measures we will 
increase the number of people bowing toward Mecca. But by forcing them to do so, we 
are taking them out of the realm of action and into mere motion, and we are depriving 
                                                          
10 However, we must acknowledge that the remainder of this passage reveals Mises not to be as clearly 
in support of free will as might be imagined. 
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all these coerced persons of the very possibility of acting morally. By attempting to 
compel virtue, we eliminate its possibility. For by compelling everyone to bow to 
Mecca, we are preventing people from doing so out of freely adopted conviction. To be 
moral, an act must be free.” 
 
When people are compelled to bow in the direction of Mecca, they are engaging 
in “mere motion.” It seems that Rothbard would say much the same if the people were 
not pushed, but instead went to the floor because they slipped on unexpected banana 
peels or had seizures. It is only when they bow of their own accord that they can be said 
to be engaging in human action. This concern for human action in contrast to mere 
motion just is a concern for when people express a free will. Such freedom, then, is part 
of the core building blocks of the Austrian project.  
 
It is also important to note that Rothbard vehemently rejected at least a the sort 
of determinism that holds that the actual causes of human behaviour can ever be 
sufficiently known to allow prediction while dispensing with talk of purposeful choice. 
Rothbard worried that many economic historians had overly “mechanical” economic 
views (Gordon, 2010) and that many social scientists may dismiss consciousness as 
positivists and behaviourists had, or endorse a crude social determinism, like that 
endorsed by some Marxists, according to which the ideas people hold are mere by-
products of the institutions or conditions under which they live (Rothbard 2006). While 
some aspects of nature are indeed mechanical, predictable, and can be understood 
without appeal to consciousness, Rothbard (2006) argues that “it is an essential attribute 
of man's nature that he has consciousness, and therefore that his actions are self-
determined by the choices his mind makes.” Again, this foundational concern for 
individual choice is central to the project of Austrian economics.       
 
We get a clear picture of what Rothbard (2006) rejects when he writes: “At very 
best, the application of determinism to man is just an agenda for the future. After several 
centuries of arrogant proclamations, no determinist has come up with anything like a 
theory determining all of men's actions.”  It is determinism, not as a general philosophic 
doctrine, but as a view according to which we will “be able, some day, to determine 
what man's choices and actions will be.” Rothbard (2006) particularly names 
“behaviorists, positivists, Marxists” in this regard. Historically, many of the 
behaviorists hoped to not only predict human behaviour, but also to engineer it (much 
as some self-styled “choice architects” aspire to today). People, however, are not simple 
and mechanical in this way, and attempts to understand, and manipulate, them in this 
deterministic fashion are unlikely to succeed. Beyond Rothbard’s arguments to this 
effect, we would also highlight Hayek’s important work on complex systems, which 
include economic and social systems, as well as human minds (see Hayek 1967, Gaus 
2006, 2007). Complex systems, even when composed of parts that are determinate and 
simple, can be practically impossible to predict because they have sensitivity to initial 
conditions, feedback mechanisms that can amplify or reverse a pattern, and similar 
characteristics that prevent precise prediction of the behaviour of particular elements. 
Of course, general patterns of the aggregate system can often be understood, as that the 
weather will include more rain in Seattle than Tucson over the next year or that 
increases in minimum wage will tend to increase unemployment, without being capable 
of predicting the details for individuals, such as what specific days will get rain or which 
specific person will become unemployed.   
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We see from these considerations not only that the Austrian economists did 
endorse free will, but also why such an endorsement is central to their project. The 
Austrian tradition, in contrast to theories in the grip of scientism and adopting an overly 
mechanistic view of human behaviour, sees humans as purposeful choice makers, 
responding not merely in instructive ways to external stimuli, but through their own 
desires and preferences in ways that are largely unpredictable. 
 
VII. Additional Considerations for Libertarians 
 
Outside of the specifically economic considerations, and in the broader moral 
and political domain, Rothbard brings out additional reasons for his commitment to free 
will. For instance, Rothbard (1998/1982, p. 80) writes against “incitement” laws. “Since 
every man is free to adopt or not adopt any course of action he wishes, we cannot say 
that in some way [an inciter] determined the members of the mob to their criminal 
activities; we cannot make him, because of his exhortation, at all responsible for their 
crimes.”11 The point is, the members of the “crowd” are able to make up their own 
minds concerning the question of whether it is wise, ethical, to riot. They are free to 
choose their own reaction to the inciter. This view makes sense, for if anyone is to be 
held responsible at all, it must be the members of the crowd who are freely choosing to 
riot. To hold the inciter responsible seems to deny that the rioters themselves actually 
had a free choice in the matter, but if the rioters are not free and responsible, it is not 
clear how the inciter can be thought to be so for his own riot-encouraging behaviour. 
 
In a related vein, libertarian philosopher Tibor Machan (2004) argues that many 
of our normative judgments, moral and otherwise, presuppose free will. Claims about 
what actions are right or wrong, laws are just or unjust, arguments are sound or unsound, 
rights deserve respect, and so on, all imply claims about what we ought to do, 
implement, believe, or show respect for. According to the principle that ‘ought implies 
can,’ Machan argues, “… only if it is possible to choose to do something can it be the 
case that it ought to be done. So the very meaningfulness of the advocacy of political 
ideals implies that free will exists.” That is, we must think that people are free to choose 
whatever it is we say that ought to do, for “something they have no choice about cannot 
be something they morally ought to and can fail to do.” The behaviorist who spurns 
consciousness for "objective" laboratory data must rely on the consciousness of his 
laboratory associates to report the data to him” (Machan). 
 
Nor can we ignore this additional point made by Machan (2004): “Those who 
deny that we have free will simply cannot make sense of our distinction between cases 
in which one controls one's behavior and those in which one is being moved by forces 
over which he or she has no control. When we face the latter sort of case, we still admit 
that the behavior could be good or bad but we deny that it is morally and legally 
significant - it is more along lines of acts of nature or God by being out of the agent's 
control. This is also why philosophers who discuss ethics but deny free will have trouble 
distinguishing between morality and value theory - e.g., utilitarians, Marxists.” 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Here, to be clear, we are not claiming free will is correct because Rothbard and Mises says so, but 
instead aim here merely to demonstrate their views on this issue. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
We have saved one of the best arguments in this entire genre for last.  Caplan 
(1991) offers a “reductio ab absurdum.  I shall begin with the assumption of 
determinism, and show that it leads to the self-contradictory position of abject 
skepticism. 
 
“Now it is a fact that people disagree on many questions; this leads us to wonder 
if on any given issue we are correct.  How is the determinist to come to grips with this? 
If the content of my mind is determined entirely on the level of micro-particles, how 
would I ever double-check my views? I would be determined to believe them; and if 
arguments convinced me, then they would be determined to convince me.  The crucial 
point is that my views -- correct and incorrect alike -- would be the result of inexorable 
causal forces. And these forces determine people to error just as inexorably as they 
determine them to truth.  Of course, I might be correct by coincidence.  But knowledge 
is justified true belief; and when we are pre-determined to believe whatever we happen 
to believe no matter what, it is hard  to see what the justification of our beliefs is.   
 
“Put succinctly, if we have knowledge we must accept beliefs only because we 
understand them to be true; but if determinism is correct, then we automatically accept 
whatever beliefs that our constituent micro-particles impose on us, since as Searle says, 
scientific explanation works from the bottom up.  It might be the case that those micro-
particles coincidentally make me believe true things, but the truth would not be the 
ultimate causal agent  acting upon me.   
 
“Determinism, then, leads to skepticism, the denial of the possibility of justified 
true belief.  This is a controversial issue, but I hold that skepticism is necessarily false.  
For suppose we affirm skepticism.  Then we may wonder if we know that skepticism is 
true.  If we do know it, then at least one item of objective knowledge exists, which 
contradicts the premise.  But if we don't know that skepticism is true either, why should 
we accept it?  To recap: Determinism implies skepticism; skepticism is necessarily 
false; Hence determinism is false.” 
 
It is difficult to see how the deterministic position can withstand this knock-out 
blow. The reductio ad absurdum is one of the most powerful tools in the entire 
armament of the philosopher. Caplan starts out with the basic postulates of determinism. 
He rigorously and logically deduces from those premises, and arrives at conclusions 
impossible to defend. We must thus look askance at the basic building blocks of 
determinism, and embrace the free will position.12 
 
Rothbard (2006) put the point this way: “If we are determined in the ideas we 
accept, then X, the determinist, is determined to believe in determinism, while Y, the 
believer in free will, is also determined to believe in his own doctrine. Since man's mind 
is, according to determinism, not free to think and come to conclusions about reality, it 
is absurd for X to try to convince Y or anyone else of the truth of determinism. In short, 
the determinist must rely, for the spread of his ideas, on the non-determined, free-
                                                          
12 For other refutations of determinism, see Lucretius, 2005; Searle, 2008; 
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will choices of others, on their free will to adopt or reject ideas. In the same way, the 
various brands of determinists-behaviorists, positivists, Marxists, and so on-implicitly 
claim special exemption for themselves from their own determined systems. But if a 
man cannot affirm a proposition without employing its negation, he is not only caught 
in an inextricable self-contradiction; he is conceding to the negation the status of an 
axiom. 
 
“A corollary self-contradiction: the determinists profess to be able, some day, 
to determine what man's choices and actions will be. But, on their own grounds, their 
own knowledge of this determining theory is itself determined. How then can they 
aspire to know all, if the extent of their own knowledge is itself determined, and 
therefore arbitrarily delimited? In fact, if our ideas are determined, then we have no 
way of freely revising our judgments and of learning truth-whether the truth of 
determinism or of anything else. 
 
“Thus, the determinist, to advocate his doctrine, must place himself and his 
theory outside the allegedly universally determined realm, that is, he must 
employ free will. This reliance of determinism on its negation is an instance of a wider 
truth: that it is self-contradictory to use reason in any attempt to deny the validity of 
reason as a means of attaining knowledge. Such self-contradiction is implicit in such 
currently fashionable sentiments as "reason shows us that reason is weak," or "the more 
we know, the more we know how little we know." 
 
In the view of Machan (2004): “The determinist wants us to believe in 
determinism. In fact, he believes we ought to be determinists rather than believe in this 
myth called ‘free will.’ But, as the saying goes in philosophy, ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ 
That is, if one ought to believe in or do something, this implies that one has a choice in 
the matter; it implies that we can make a choice as to whether determinism or the free 
will is a better doctrine. That, then, it assumes that we are free. In other words, even 
arguing for determinism assumes that we are not determined to believe in free will or 
determined but that it is a matter of our making certain choices about arguments, 
evidence, and thinking itself.” 
 
Why is it so? It is because Machan is in effect saying that supporters of the 
determinist position necessarily commit a performative contradiction.13  Statements of 
its adherents, e.g., “We should all accept the determinist position since it is correct”, 
their “performance,” logically contradict the position they are trying to foist upon us, 
since if determinism were correct, we could not choose between the two positions. 
Rather, we would be compelled, not by a gunman but by the make-up of our brains and 
all we have experienced, to accept one side or the other. The “debate” between the two, 
in this regard, would be akin to a fraud. It is already (pre) determined, by history and 
our physical beings, mainly our brains. 
 
 
                                                          
13 For an elaboration of this concept, see Hoppe 2006  
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